Tri-level Multi-follower Decision Making by Zhang, G et al.
Chapter 6 
Tri-level Multi-follower Decision Making 
In a tri-level hierarchical decision problem, each decision entity at one level has its 
objective, constraints and decision variables affected in part by the decision 
entities at the other two levels. The choice of values for its variables may allow it 
to influence the decisions made at other levels, and thereby improve its own 
objective. We called this a tri-level decision problem. When multiple decision 
entities are involved at the middle and bottom levels, the top-level entity‟s 
decision will be affected not only by these followers‟ individual reactions but also 
by the relationships among the followers. We call this problem a tri-level multi-
follower (TLMF) decision. 
In this chapter, we first identify tri-level decision problems from real world 
cases in Section 6.1.We then introduce basic tri-level decision-making models in 
Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents a framework for the TLMF decision through 
analyzing various kinds of relationships between decision entities in a tri-level 
decision problem. The TLMF decision framework contains 64 standard TLMF 
decision-making situations. To model these TLMF decision situations, we extend 
the bi-level decision entity-relationship diagram (DERD) approach introduced in 
Chapter 4 to describe tri-level decision problems. Furthermore, we establish a set 
of standard and hybrid TLMF decision models using a mathematical programming 
approach in Section 6.4. A set of case studies illustrates the development of TLMF 
decision models by DERD, as well as programming approaches, in Section 6.5. 
Section 6.6 gives solution concepts for a linear tri-level decision problem. It also 
presents a set of tri-level programming algorithms including a tri-level Kth-Best 
algorithm. Section 6.7 focuses on solution methods for the proposed 64 kinds of 
TLMF decision model. To discuss this in detail, we take the TLMF decision 
model S12 in its linear version as a representative to illustrate solution concepts 
and theoretical properties, and to describe a TLMF Kth-Best algorithm for TLMF 
decision-making. Finally, Section 6.8 summarizes this chapter.  
6.1 Problem Identification 
Some decision problems require making a compromise between the objectives of 
several interacting decision entities(DE) allocated in a three-level hierarchy. The 
execution of decisions is sequential, from top to middle and then to bottom levels. 




Each decision entity independently optimizes (maximizes or minimizes) its own 
objective but is affected by the actions of other decision entities at the other two 
levels. Such a hierarchical decision process appears naturally in many 
organizations and business systems. 
We use a university example here to explain the nature of the problem.  
 
Example 6.1 A university is organized with three faculties (Information, 
Business, Science) and each faculty has 2-4 departments. The university aims to 
improve its research quality through creating new research development strategies 
in 2013. The strategies made at university level directly affect the research 
strategy-making in its faculties. This process continues within a hierarchy of 
decision entities, including its departments and research centers. In the meantime, 
the actions at the faculty level may affect the research development strategies 
sought by the university and the actions at department level may affect those of its 
faculty. Each related decision entity in this university wishes to optimize its 
individual research development objective in view of the partial control exercised 
at other levels. The university‟s decision makers can control this effect by 
exercising preemptive-partial control over the university through budget 
modifications or regulations, but subject to possible reactions from its faculties 
and also departments. This kind of decision problem is called a multi-level 
decision problem or multi-level optimization problem. 
 
The complexity of decision problems increases significantly when the number 
of levels (n) is greater than two (Blair 1992). The tri-level decision is the most 
typical form of multi-level decision (𝑛 > 2). In a tri-level decision, the decision 
entity at the top level is called the leader, while entities at the middle and bottom 
levels are the followers. However, a decision entity at the middle level is also the 
leader for associate entities at the bottom level. As a tri-level decision reflects the 
main features of multi-level decision problems, the models and methods 
developed for tri-level decisions can be easily extended to other multi-level 
decision problems.  
The tri-level decision problem has been studied by researchers such as White 
(1997), Bard and Falk (1982a), Lai (1996) and Shih et al. (1996). The existing 
research results are mostly limited to the one-level one-entity situation. In real 
world tri-level decision applications, decisions are often made in situations where 
several decision entities are at the middle and bottom levels and interact with one 
another in some way. Consider Example 6.1. As these three faculties may have 
different objectives and different reactions to each possible decision made by the 
university, they should be treated as multiple entities at the middle level. These 
faculties may also have various relationships between each other, such as sharing 
their decision variables or not, and sharing their constraints or not, which may 
create different decision situations. As a result, the university‟s decision will be 




affected not only by its faculties‟ individual optimal reactions but also by the 
relationships between faculties and related departments. Some research, such as 
Shih et al. (1996), considered tri-level decision problems with multiple followers. 
However, very few studies classify the possible relationships among these 
followers and discuss different models to handle different situations. 
Another issue related to tri-level decision-making is the relationship between 
the top-level decision entity and the bottom-level entities. In general, in a tri-level 
decision problem, the top-level decision entity‟s solution will be directly affected 
by the middle-level decision entities but indirectly affected by the bottom-level 
decision entities. However, in some cases, the solution of the top-level decision 
entity can be directly affected by the bottom-level entities‟ reactions as well. 
Considering Example 6.1, this university leader may also take a department‟s 
feedback in strategy making and in such a situation its decisions will be directly 
affected by its departments‟ reactions. 
A more complex situation occurs when different entities at the same level have 
different decision situations. Considering Example 6.1, some faculties‟ 
departments make decisions (reactions) cooperatively while others do not.  For 
example, all the departments in the Business Faculty react cooperatively to the 
decisions of the faculty, whereas the departments in the Information Faculty react 
uncooperatively to decisions made by the Faculty. 
In summary, tri-level decisions involve a variety of situations caused by 
various possible relationships among multiple decision entities at two lower 
levels. The following sections will first provide basic tri-level decision models and 
will then model TLMF decision problems in various situations. 
6.2 Basic Tri-level Decision Models 
Basic tri-level decision focuses on a one-level one-entity situation and therefore 
has only three decision entities: DE1, DE2, and DE3. It can be described as 
follows (Bard and Falk 1982a): 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓1 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧  DE1  
 s.t. 𝑔1 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ≤ 0,  
where 𝑦, 𝑧 solve: 
min
𝑦∈𝑌
𝑓2 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧  DE2  




𝑓3 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 (DE3) 
s.t. 𝑔3 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ≤ 0,                                             (6.1) 




where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑛 ,   𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 ⊂ 𝑅𝑚 ,   𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 ⊂ 𝑅𝑝 , 𝑓𝑖 :𝑋 × 𝑌 × 𝑍 → 𝑅 ,  𝑖 = 1,2,3 , 
variables x, y, 𝑧 are called the top-level, middle-level and bottom-level variables, 
and 𝑓1(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧), 𝑓2(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧), 𝑓3(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧) are the top-level, middle-level and bottom-
level objective functions respectively.  
From the tri-level decision model (6.1), we can see that this decision problem 
has three optimization sub-problems (objective functions). Each level has 
individual control variables within its optimization sub-problem, but also 
considers other levels‟ variables in its optimization sub-problem. This decision 
process is sequential: decision entity DE 1, at the top-level, selects an action 
within its specified constraint set, then DE 2, at the middle-level, responds within 
its constraint set, and lastly DE 3 responds. 
To solve the tri-level decision problem, Bard and Falk (1982a) first developed a 
cutting plane algorithm and White (1997) developed a penalty function approach. 
In the meantime, Lai (1996) and Shih et al. (1996) extended the tri-level decision 
research in two aspects. One is that they developed a fuzzy approach to solve 
multi-level programming problems. The other is that a TLMF decision model is 
proposed in which multiple followers are at both middle and bottom levels. Below 
is a TLMF model. It assumes three sub-problems as centre 𝑓1 → division 
𝑓2𝑖 →subdivision, 𝑓3𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, 2,… , 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑠 (Shih et al. 1996): 
min
𝑥1
𝑓1 𝑥 =  𝑐1𝑗𝑥𝑗
𝑗
          (top level) 
where𝑥2𝑖 , 𝑥3𝑖1,… , 𝑥3𝑖𝑡𝑖solve 
min
𝑥2𝑖
𝑓2𝑖 𝑥 =  𝑐2𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗
𝑗
        (middle level) 
where𝑥3𝑖1,… , 𝑥3𝑖𝑡𝑖solve 
min
𝑥3𝑖1
𝑓3𝑖1 𝑥 =  𝑐3𝑖1𝑗𝑥𝑗
𝑗
     (bottom level) 
                     ⋮ 
min
𝑥3𝑖𝑡𝑖
𝑓3𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝑥 =  𝑐3𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗
𝑗
 
s.t. 𝐴1𝑥1 + 𝐴2𝑖𝑥2𝑖 + 𝐴3𝑖1𝑥3𝑖1＋⋯＋𝐴3𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑥3𝑖𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑏,  
𝑥𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑛,                                                         (6.2) 
In this model, there is one decision entity at the top level, s decision entities at 
the middle level and 𝑡 =  𝑡𝑖𝑖  decision entities at the bottom level. This is a 
general TLMF decision model with uncooperative relationships which adopts the 
decisions of other decision entities as references.  




In the following section, we will provide more discussion on the TLMF 
decision models and solution methods. 
6.3 Tri-level Multi-follower Decision Framework  
This section first identifies seven issues which are related to the TLMF decision 
classification, and then presents a TLMF decision framework and a DERD 
modeling approach for TLMF decision situations.  
6.3.1 TLMF Decision Concepts 
When a tri-level decision problem has multiple followers at the middle level 
and/or the bottom level, we call it a TLMF decision problem. The model given in 
(6.1) describes a basic situation of tri-level decision, that is, each level has one 
decision entity only. Problem (6.2) presents the model for a general TLMF 
decision problem. In order to identify and classify TLMF decision situations, we 
first introduce the following concepts: 
(1) Neighborhood entity: two decision entities are at the same level, led by the 
same decision entity. All neighborhood entities under the same leader are 
called a neighborhood entity set (NES). 
(2) Cooperative entity: two neighborhood entities share their decision 
variables and have the same objective and constraint functions. In such a 
case, we consider the two entities as one.   
(3) Semi-cooperative entity: two neighborhood entities share their decision 
variables but have distinct objectives and constraint functions. 
(4) Uncooperative entity: two neighborhood entities have distinct decision 
variables, objectives, and constraints. 
(5) Reference-uncooperative entity: two neighborhood entities have distinct 
decision variables, objectives and constraints but take account of others‟ 
variables as references; that is, they include others‟ variables in their 
objective/constraint functions, but not as control variables. 
(6) Direct and secondary follower: all decision entities at the middle level are 
direct followers of the top-level decision entity (similarly, each bottom-
level entity is a direct follower of an entity at the middle level); and all 
entities at the bottom level are secondary followers of the top-level 
decision entity. 
(7) Direct leader and secondary leader: a decision entity at the top level is 
the direct leader of all decision entities at the middle level (similarly, each 
bottom-level entity has a direct leader at the middle level) and is the 
secondary leader of all decision entities at the bottom level. 




6.3.2 TLMF Decision Problem Classification 
In a TLMF decision problem, a middle-level decision entity has two roles in 
decision-making process, that is, it reacts to each possible strategy made by the 
top-level entity and is influenced by the decisions of the followers at the bottom 
level. Different relationships between the decision entities at the middle level and 
bottom level could result in different processes for deriving an optimal solution for 
the decision entity at the top level. The top level‟s decision will also sometimes be 
affected by the reactions of its secondary followers as well as those of its direct 
followers. We therefore list the following relationships between decision entities 
for TLMF decision problems: 
(1) Leader-follower relationship: if an entity is a direct follower of another 
entity (leader), we say there is a leader-follower relationship or leadership 
relationship between the two entities.  
(2) Secondary leadership relationship: if the top-level decision entity directly 
considers the reactions of an entity at the bottom level, that is, includes a 
control variable of this bottom-level entity in its objective and/or 
constraints, we say that this top-level entity and the bottom-level entity‟s 
NES have a secondary leadership relationship. 
(3) Uncooperative relationship: if there are uncooperative entities but no 
reference-uncooperative entities in a NES, we say there is an 
uncooperative relationship in this NES.  
(4) Reference-uncooperative relationship: if there are reference-
uncooperative entities in a NES and the rest are uncooperative, we say 
there is a reference-uncooperative relationship in this NES.  
(5) Cooperative relationship at the middle level: if all entities in a NES are 
cooperative, we say there is a cooperative relationship in this NES.  
(6) Semi-cooperative relationship at the middle level: if there are semi-
cooperative entities in a NES and the rest, if any, are cooperative entities, 
we say there is a semi-cooperative relationship in this NES. 
(7) Secondary followership relationship: if a bottom-level decision entity 
includes the control variables of the top-level decision entity in its 
objective and/or constraints, we call the relationship between this bottom-
level entity‟s NES and the top-level entity a secondary followership 
relationship.  
6.3.3 TLMF Decision Framework 
Based on the above seven relationships defined, a TLMF decision framework is 
established as shown in Table6.1.The framework also presents a classification for 
TLMF decision problems. Under the eight features (SL, ML-V, ML-O, ML-R, SF, 
BL-V, BL-O, and BL-R) given in Table 6.1, “𝑌” means “yes”, “𝑁” means “no”, 




and blank means „not applicable‟. A total of 64 standard situations of TLMF 
decision problems are identified, named S1, S2,…, and S64 (note that some 
combinations of these features are not applicable). Each situation is described by 
using these seven relationships. We can describe any complex TLMF decision 
problem by combining two or more of these standard situations. For example, in a 
TLMF decision problem, a set of bottom-level entities are in the S1 situation and 
another set of bottom-level entities match the features of S2. We describe this 
problem of the combination of S1 and S2 as a hybrid situation. 
The abbreviations used in Table 6.1 for the features are explained as follows: 
(1) SL: secondary leadership relationship;  
(2) ML-V: middle-level entities have the same variables;  
(3) ML-O: middle-level entities have the same objectives and constraints; 
(4) ML-R: middle-level entities include others‟ variables as references; 
(5) SF: secondary followership relationship; 
(6) BL-V: bottom-level entities have the same variables; 
(7) BL-O: bottom-level entities have the same objectives and constraints; 
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Decision situation description 
S1 Y Y Y  Y Y Y  
Both middle and bottom levels cooperative; both secondary leadership 
and followership 
S2 Y Y Y  Y Y N  
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative; both 
secondary leadership and followership 
S3 Y Y Y  Y N  Y 
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; both 
secondary leadership and followership 
S4 Y Y Y  Y N  N 
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; both secondary 
leadership and followership 
S5 Y Y Y  N Y Y  Both middle and bottom levels cooperative; secondary leadership only 
S6 Y Y Y  N Y N  
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative; secondary 
leadership only 
S7 Y Y Y  N N  Y 
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; 
secondary leadership only 
S8 Y Y Y  N N  N 
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; secondary 
leadership only 
S9 Y Y N  Y Y Y  
Middle-level semi-cooperative; bottom-level cooperative; both 
secondary leadership and followership 
S10 Y Y N  Y Y N  
Both middle and bottom levels semi-cooperative; both secondary 
leadership and followership 
S11 Y Y N  Y N  Y 
Middle-level semi-cooperative, bottom-level reference uncooperative; 
both secondary leadership and followership 
S12 Y Y N  Y N  N 
Middle-level semi-cooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; both 
secondary leadership and followership 




S13 Y Y N  N Y Y  
Middle-level semi-cooperative; bottom-level cooperative; secondary 
leadership only 
S14 Y Y N  N Y N  
Both middle and bottom levels semi-cooperative; secondary leadership 
only 
S15 Y Y N  N N  Y 
Middle-level semi-cooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; 
secondary leadership only 
S16 Y Y N  N N  N 
Middle-level semi-cooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; secondary 
leadership only 
S17 Y N  Y Y Y Y  
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level cooperative; both 
secondary leadership and followership 
S18 Y N  Y Y Y N  
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative; 
both secondary leadership and followership 
S19 Y N  Y Y N  Y 
Both middle and bottom levels reference-uncooperative; both 
secondary leadership and followership 
S20 Y N  Y Y N  N 
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; 
both secondary leadership and followership 
S21 Y N  Y N Y Y  
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level cooperative; 
secondary leadership only 
S22 Y N  Y N Y N  
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative; 
secondary leadership only 
S23 Y N  Y N N  Y 
Both middle and bottom levels reference-uncooperative; secondary 
leadership only 
S24 Y N  Y N N  N 
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; 
secondary leadership only 
S25 Y N  N Y Y Y  
Middle-level uncooperative; bottom-level cooperative; both secondary 
leadership and followership 
S26 Y N  N Y Y N  Middle-level uncooperative; bottom-level semi-cooperative; both 




secondary leadership and followership 
S27 Y N  N Y N  Y 
Middle-level uncooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; 
both secondary leadership and followership 
S28 Y N  N Y N  N 
Both middle and bottom levels uncooperative; both secondary 
leadership and followership 
S29 Y N  N N Y Y  
Middle-level uncooperative; bottom-level cooperative; secondary 
leadership only 
S30 Y N  N N Y N  
Middle-level uncooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative, secondary 
leadership only 
S31 Y N  N N N  Y 
Middle-level uncooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; 
secondary leadership only 
S32 Y N  N N N  N 
Both middle and bottom levels uncooperative; secondary leadership 
only 
S33 N Y Y  Y Y Y  
Both middle and bottom levels cooperative; secondary followership 
only 
S34 N Y Y  Y Y N  
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative; secondary 
followership only 
S35 N Y Y  Y N  Y 
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; 
secondary followership only 
S36 N Y Y  Y N  N 
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; secondary 
followership only 
S37 N Y Y  N Y Y  Both middle and bottom levels cooperative; no secondary relationships 
S38 N Y Y  N Y N  
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative; no secondary 
relationships 
S39 N Y Y  N N  Y 
Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; no 
secondary relationships 
S40 N Y Y  N N  N Middle-level cooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; no secondary 





S41 N Y N  Y Y Y  
Middle-level semi-cooperative; bottom-level cooperative; secondary 
followership only 
S42 N Y N  Y Y N  
Both middle and bottom levels semi-cooperative; secondary 
followership only 
S43 N Y N  Y N  Y 
Middle-level semi-cooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; 
secondary followership only 
S44 N Y N  Y N  N 
Middle-level semi-cooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; secondary 
followership only 
S45 N Y N  N Y Y  
Middle-level semi-cooperative; bottom-level cooperative; no secondary 
relationships 
S46 N Y N  N Y N  
Both middle and bottom levels semi-cooperative, no secondary 
relationships 
S47 N Y N  N N  Y 
Middle-level semi-cooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; 
no secondary relationships 
S48 N Y N  N N  N 
Middle-level semi-cooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; no 
secondary relationships 
S49 N N  Y Y Y Y  
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level cooperative; 
secondary followership only 
S50 N N  Y Y Y N  
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative; 
secondary followership only 
S51 N N  Y Y N  Y 
Both middle and bottom levels reference-uncooperative; secondary 
followership only 
S52 N N  Y Y N  N 
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; 
secondary followership only 
S53 N N  Y N Y Y  
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level cooperative; no 
secondary relationships 




S54 N N  Y N Y N  
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative; 
no secondary relationships 
S55 N N  Y N N  Y 
Both middle and bottom levels reference-uncooperative; no secondary 
relationships 
S56 N N  Y N N  N 
Middle-level reference-uncooperative, bottom-level uncooperative; no 
secondary relationships 
S57 N N  N Y Y Y  
Middle-level uncooperative; bottom-level cooperative; secondary 
followership only 
S58 N N  N Y Y N  
Middle-level uncooperative; bottom-level semi-cooperative; secondary 
followership only 
S59 N N  N Y N  Y 
Middle-level uncooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; 
secondary followership only 
S60 N N  N Y N  N 
Both middle and bottom levels uncooperative; secondary followership 
only 
S61 N N  N N Y Y  
Middle-level uncooperative; bottom-level cooperative; no secondary 
relationships 
S62 N N  N N Y N  
Middle-level uncooperative, bottom-level semi-cooperative, no 
secondary relationships 
S63 N N  N N N  Y 
Middle-level uncooperative, bottom-level reference-uncooperative; no 
secondary relationships 
S64 N N  N N N  N 
Both middle and bottom levels uncooperative; no secondary 
relationships 
  




6.3.4 TLMF Decision Entity-Relationship Diagrams 
We have identified seven decision-entity relationships: a normal leader-follower 
relationship and six implicit relationships. These seven relationships are capable 
of fully reflecting the features of the TLMF decision problems identified in Table 
6.1 and any of their combinations. Based on this, we introduce a TLMF Decision 
Entity-Relationship Diagrams (TLMF-DERD) approach and use it in TLMF 




Figure6.1 Notations for TLMF decision entity-relationship diagrams 
Symbol Meaning 
 Decision entity 
A 
B 
Leadership relationship: “A” is 
theLeader, “B” is its Follower. 
Secondary leadership relationship: 
“A” is the top-level entity and “C” 
is a bottom-level entity. 
A 
C 
Secondary followership relationship: 
“A” is the top-level entity, and “C” is 
a followership entity. 
A 
C 
“A1” and “A2” have a cooperative 
relationship in a NES. A1, A2 
“A1” and “A2” have a semi-cooperative 
relationship in a NES. A1 A2 
“A1” and “A2” have a reference-
uncooperative relationship in a NES. A1 A2 
“A1” and “A2” have an uncooperative 
relationship in a NES. 
A1 A2 




This TLMF-DERD approach is a concept modeling of TLMF decision 
problems. In the following sections, we will show how a TLMF decision problem 
is first described by the DERD approach and then presented in a tri-level 
programming model.  
6.4 Tri-level Multi-follower Decision Models 
This section first describes a general TLMF decision model using multi-level 
programming. It then presents a set of specific models for some standard TLMF 
decision problems including S9, S12, S15, S18, S20, S25 and S32 selected from 
Table 6.1. We also give a hybrid TLMF decision model for a decision situation 
which is the combination of S63 and S64. 
6.4.1 General Model for TLMF Decision 
A general TLMF decision model, which covers all the 64 TLMF decision 
situations, is given as follows: 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) 
s.t. 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛), solve the ith middle-level follower‟s and its 





 𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑖 ,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖  
s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑖 ,…𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ≤ 0, 





 3 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ≤ 0, 
𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 ,                                      (6.3) 
where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑙1 ,𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙2𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 ⊂ 𝑅







𝑖=1  → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖
 2 :𝑋 ×  𝑌𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ×  𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 ×  𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1 ,
𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
In this model, there is one top decision entity 𝑓 1  and n middle decision 
entities with objectives 𝑓1
 2 ,… ,𝑓𝑛
 2 
. For the ith middle decision problem, there 
are 𝑚𝑖  sub-problems 𝑓𝑖1
 3 ,… , 𝑓𝑖𝑚 𝑖
 3 
 to optimize. Based on this model, we can 




establish models, also supported by DERD for all the 64 standard TLMF decision 
situations presented in Table6.1.  
6.4.2 Typical Standard Models for TLMF Decision 
This section will present seven typical TLMF decision models from the 64 models 
proposed in Section 6.3.3 by using both DERD and tri-level programming 
approaches.  
 
(1) S9 Model 
Figure 6.2 The DERD of TLMF decision situation S9 
This model presents a TLMF decision problem which has the following features 
and is described by DERD in Figure 6.2:  
1) The top level entity takes the control variables of the decision entities at 
both middle and bottom levels into consideration in its objectives, that is, 
there is a secondary leadership relationship;  
2) The middle-level decision entities have the same variables; 
3) The middle-level decision entities have individual objective functions and 
constraints, that is, they have a semi-cooperative relationship;  
4) The bottom-level decision entities include the control variables of the top-
level entity, that is, there is a secondary followership relationship; 
5) The bottom-level decision entities have the same variables; 
6) The bottom-level decision entities have the same objective functions and 
constraints, that is, they have a cooperative relationship. 
We describe the S9 model by the tri-level programming approach as follows: 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧1,… , 𝑧𝑛) 
s.t. 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧1,… , 𝑧𝑛) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑦, 𝑧𝑖(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛) solve the ith middle-level follower‟s problem and its 
bottom-level  followers‟ problems : 
A 
… B1 Bn 
C11…C1m1 … Cn1…Cnmn 







 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖) ≤ 0, 





 3 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 3 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖) ≤ 0,                                      (6.4) 
where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑙1 , 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙2 , 𝑧𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙3𝑖 ,𝑌 = 𝑌1 ∩⋯∩ 𝑌𝑛 ,𝑓
 1 :𝑋 × 𝑌 ×
 𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖
 2 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖
 3 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖 → 𝑅, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛. 
In this model, there is one top-level decision entity 𝑓 1 and n middle-level 




 respectively. Since these middle-
level entities have a semi-cooperative relationship, we describe all middle-level 
followers as sharing a decision variable 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑖  and having individual objective 
functions 𝑓𝑖
(2)
 and the individual constraints 𝑔𝑖
(2)
≤ 0 . For any middle-level 
decision problem 𝑓𝑖
 2 
, there are 𝑚𝑖  sub-problems 𝑓𝑖1
(3)
,… , 𝑓𝑖𝑚 𝑖
(3)
 at the bottom level. 
As all bottom-level neighborhood decision entities attached to the ith middle-level 
follower share variables, objective functions and constraints, that is, they are in a 
cooperative relationship. We describe this feature as the shared variable 𝑧𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑖  
and 𝑓𝑖1
(3)










. To describe the secondary 
leadership relationship, we have 𝑧1,… , 𝑧𝑛  in the objective functions and 
constraints of the top-level decision entity. 
 
(2) S12 Model 
 
Figure 6.3 The DERD of TLMF decision situation S12 
This model presents a TLMF decision problem which has the following features 
and is described by DERD in Figure 6.3:  
1) There is a secondary leadership relationship;  
2) The decision entities at the middle level have the same variables; 
… C1m1 Cn1 Cnmn 
A 
B1 Bn … 
… … C11 




3) The middle-level decision entities have a semi-cooperative relationship;  
4) There is a secondary followership relationship; 
5) The bottom-level decision entities have individual variables; 
6) The bottom-level decision entities have an uncooperative relationship. 
We describe the S12 model by the tri-level programming approach as follows: 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) 
s.t. 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛) solve the ith middle-level follower‟s problem 




 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,⋯ , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,⋯ , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ≤ 0, 





 3 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) ≤ 0,                                      (6.5) 
where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑙1 , 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙2 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙3𝑖𝑗 ,𝑌 = 𝑌1 ∩⋯∩ 𝑌𝑛 ,𝑓
 1 :𝑋 ×




𝑖=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖
 2 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 ×  𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖𝑗 → 𝑅, 𝑖 =
1,… ,𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
In this model, for the ith middle-level decision problem, there are 𝑚𝑖  sub-
problems 𝑓𝑖1
 3 ,… , 𝑓𝑖𝑚 𝑖
 3 
 at the bottom level. As the bottom-level decision entities 
are uncooperative, that is, they have the individual decision variables 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 , 
objective 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 
 and constraint 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 
 for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
 
(3) S15 Model 
 
Figure 6.4 The DERD of TLMF decision situation S15 
C11 
… 









This model presents a TLMF decision problem which has the following features 
and is described by DERD in Figure 6.4:  
1) There is a secondary leadership relationship;  
2) The middle-level decision entities have the same variables; 
3) The middle-level decision entities have a semi-cooperative relationship;  
4) There is no secondary followership relationship; 
5) The bottom-level decision entities have individual variables; 
6) The bottom-level decision entities are reference-uncooperative. 
We describe the S15 model by the tri-level programming approach as follows: 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) 
s.t. 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) ≤ 0, 
where𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖  (𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛) solve the ith middle-level follower‟s problem 




 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ≤ 0, 





 3 (𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ≤ 0,                                 (6.6) 
where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑙1 , 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙2 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙3𝑖𝑗 , 𝑌 = 𝑌1 ∩⋯∩ 𝑌𝑛 , 𝑓
 1 :𝑋 ×




𝑖=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖
 2 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 ×  𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 :𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖𝑗 → 𝑅, 𝑖 =
1,… ,𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
In this model, the bottom level has no secondary followership relationship to 





 of the bottom level. As the bottom-level decision entities attached 
to the ith middle-level follower are reference-uncooperative, we have 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖  
in all objective functions 𝑓𝑖1
 3 ,… , 𝑓𝑖𝑚 𝑖
 3 
 and constraints 𝑔𝑖1
 3 ,… ,𝑔𝑖𝑚 𝑖
 3 
 of the bottom 
level for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛. 
 
(4) S18 Model 
 
This model will present a TLMF decision problem which has the following 
features and is described by DERD in Figure 6.5: 
1) There is a secondary leadership relationship;  




2) The middle-level decision entities have individual variables; 
3) The middle-level entities have a reference-uncooperative relationship;  
4) There is a secondary followership relationship; 
5) The bottom-level decision entities have the same variables; 
6) The bottom-level entities have a semi-cooperative relationship. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 The DERD of TLMF decision situation S18 
We describe the S18 model by the tri-level programming approach as follows: 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧1,… , 𝑧𝑛) 
s.t. 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧1,… , 𝑧𝑛) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛)  solve the ith middle-level follower‟s problem and its 




 2 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧𝑖) 
                                               s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧𝑖) ≤ 0, 





 3 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) ≤ 0,                                     (6.7) 
where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑙1 ,  𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙2𝑖 ,  𝑧𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙3𝑖 ,  𝑍𝑖 = 𝑍𝑖1 ∩⋯∩ 𝑍𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ,  
𝑓 1 :𝑋 ×  𝑌𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ×  𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖
 2 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖𝑗 → 𝑅,
𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
In this model, the middle-level decision entities have a reference-uncooperative 
relationship so we have 𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛  in all objective functions 𝑓𝑖
 2 
 and constraints 
𝑔𝑖
 2 
 of the middle level. As all decision entities at the bottom level have a semi-
cooperative relationship, we have the shared variable  𝑧𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑖  for the ith middle-
level follower‟s NES, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛. 
C11 
… 









(5) S20 Model 
 
Figure 6.6 The DERD of TLMF decision situation S20 
This model will present a TLMF decision problem which has the following 
features and is described by DERD in Figure 6.6:  
1) There is a secondary leadership relationship;  
2) The decision entities at the middle level have individual variables; 
3) The middle-level entities have a reference-uncooperative relationship;  
4) There is a secondary followership relationship; 
5) The bottom-level entities have individual variables; 
6) The bottom-level entities have an uncooperative relationship. 
We describe the S20 model by the tri-level programming approach as follows: 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) 
s.t. 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛) solve the ith middle-level follower‟s problem 




 2 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ≤ 0, 





 3 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) ≤ 0,                                      (6.8) 
where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑙1 ,  𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙2𝑖 ,  𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 ⊂ 𝑅







𝑖=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖
 2 :𝑋 ×  𝑌𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ×  𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖𝑗 → 𝑅, 𝑖 =
1,… ,𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
In this model, as all decision entities at the middle level have a reference-
uncooperative relationship, we have 𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛  in the objective 𝑓𝑖
 2 
 and constraint 
C11 
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 for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛 . While the bottom-level followers attached to the same 
middle-level follower have an uncooperative relationship, each bottom-level 
entity‟s objective function 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 
 and constraint 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 
 have no other counterparts‟ 
variables for 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛. 
 
(6) S25 Model 
 
Figure 6.7 The DERD of TLMF decision situation S25 
This model will present a TLMF decision problem which has the following 
features and is described by DERD in Figure 6.7: 
1) There is a secondary leadership relationship;  
2) The middle level entities have individual variables; 
3) The middle-level entities have an uncooperative relationship;  
4) There is a secondary followership relationship; 
5) The bottom-level decision entities have the same variables; 
6) The bottom-level neighborhood decision entities have a cooperative 
relationship. 
We describe the S25 model by the tri-level programming approach as follows: 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧1,… , 𝑧𝑛) 
s.t. 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧1,… , 𝑧𝑛) ≤ 0, 
where𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛) solve the ith middle-level follower‟s problem and its 




 2 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) ≤ 0, 




 3 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖










where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑙1 , 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙2𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙3𝑖𝑗 ,   𝑓 1 :𝑋 ×  𝑌𝑖
𝑛




 2 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖 → 𝑅, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
In this model, as the middle-level decision entities have an uncooperative 
relationship, each middle-level entity objective function 𝑓𝑖
 2 
 and constraint 𝑔𝑖
 2 
 
have no other counterparts‟ variables for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛. 
 
(7) S32 Model 
 
Figure 6.8 The DERD of TLMF decision situation S32 
This model will present a TLMF decision problem which has the following 
features and is described by DERD in Figure 6.8: 
1) There is a secondary leadership relationship;  
2) The middle-level decision entities have individual variables; 
3) The middle-level decision entities have an uncooperative relationship;  
4) There is no secondary followership relationship; 
5) The bottom-level decision entities have individual variables; 
6) The bottom-level decision entities have an uncooperative relationship. 
We describe the S32 model by the tri-level programming approach as follows: 
min
𝑥𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) 
s.t. 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛 , 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛) solve the ith middle-level follower‟s problem 




 2 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ≤ 0, 





 3 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) ≤ 0,                                    (6.10) 
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where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑙1 ,𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙2𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 ⊂ 𝑅













 3 :𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖𝑗 → 𝑅, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛,  
𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
In this model, 𝑧𝑖𝑗  are included in the objective functions and constraints of the 
top-level decision entity to describe the secondary leadership relationship. As 
there is no secondary followership, however, the top-level variable 𝑥  is not 
included in the objectives 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) and constraints 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) of the bottom 
level decision problem. The decision entities at both middle and bottom level are 









 have only 𝑧𝑖𝑗 , not other variables 
of the same level entities. 
6.4.3 Hybrid TLMF Decision Models 
Note that each of the 64 standard situations listed in Table 6.1 supposes that all 
entities at the same level have the same situations. For example, all the 
departments in all faculties of the university are uncooperative. However, in some 
real-world applications, the departments in the Faculty of Science are cooperative, 
and the departments in the Faculty of Business are uncooperative. We call this a 
hybrid TLMF decision problem and will describe it by a hybrid TLMF decision 
model. As an example of such hybrid problems, we present a TLMF decision 
problem in this section, which is described by DERD in Figure 6.9:  
Figure 6.9 The DERD of a hybrid TLMF decision situation 
1) The top-level decision entity is not in a secondary leadership relationship;  
2) The middle-level decision entities have individual variables; 
3) The middle-level decision entities are uncooperative;  
4) There is no secondary followership; 
5) The first NES at the bottom level are reference-uncooperative; 
C11 
… 









6) The rest of the NES at the bottom level have an uncooperative 
relationship. 




𝑓 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛) 
s.t. 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦1,… ,𝑦𝑛) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛) solve the ith middle-level follower‟s problem 
and its bottom-level  followers‟ problems: 
min
    𝑦𝑖∈𝑌𝑖
𝑓𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖
 2 (𝑥,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑧1𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚1) solves the first middle-level follower‟s jth bottom-level 




 3 (𝑦1, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ) 
s.t. 𝑔1𝑗
 3 (𝑦1, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑧𝑖𝑗 (𝑖 ≠ 1, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖) solves the ith middle-level follower‟s jth bottom-




 3 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) 
s.t. 𝑔𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) ≤ 0,                                     (6.11) 
where  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑙1 ,  𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑙2𝑖 ,  𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 ⊂ 𝑅




 2 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 ×  𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓1𝑗
 3 :𝑌1 ×  𝑍1𝑗
𝑚1
𝑗=1 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 :𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖𝑗 → 𝑅, 𝑖 =
1,… ,𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
In this model, as there is no secondary leadership, 𝑧𝑖𝑗  are not variables in the 
objective function and constraints of the top-level decision entity.  Similarly, as 
there is no secondary followership, 𝑥 is not in the objectives and constraints of the 
bottom level decision entity. The decision entities at the middle level have an 





. The bottom-level entities have two kinds of relationship: the first 
NES is reference-cooperative (refer to S63) and the others are uncooperative (refer 
to S64). Therefore, we have 𝑓1𝑗
 3 (𝑦1, 𝑧11 , 𝑧12 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ) for the first NES and 
𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 )(𝑖 =  2, 3,… ,𝑛) for other NESs at the bottom level. 




From the above analysis and discussions, using the standard and hybrid TLMF 
decision models, we can easily give the rest of the TLMF decision models 
according to the situations described in Table 6.1, as well as their hybrid models, 
based on the features of a decision problem.  
6.5 Case Studies for TLMF Decision Modeling 
In this section, we consider four tri-level multi-follower decision cases concerning 
research development strategy-making within a university to illustrate both DERD 
and programming approaches for TLMF decision modeling. 
6.5.1 Case 1: S28 Model 
Assume that the university‟s research strategy involves the university, its three 
faculties and departments. All three faculties have individual objectives, 
constraints, variables and do not take each other into consideration. The 
departments within each faculty are also uncooperative. The university takes the 
responses of both faculties and departments into account. At the same time, the 
faculties and departments fully consider the research strategies of the university. 
This TLMF decision problem is described in Figure 6.10. 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Case 1 of the university research development strategy-making  
We give the variables, objectives and constraints of these decision entities as 
follows: 
1) The university (leader): Objective 𝑓 1  is to maximize research quantum 
which includes the number of publications (can be transformed to points) and 
research grant income (can be transformed to points). To achieve this aim, the 
main strategy of the university is to achieve a good balance between rewarding 
research performance and building a long-term research development 
environment. It has 
Variable 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2): 
University  
X 




















𝑥1: How much is used to reward the faculties‟ research performance, with the 
aim of encouraging faculties to attract more research grants and generate more 
publications; 
𝑥2: How much is used for the university‟s long-term research investment, such 





≤ 0: annual research budget; 
𝑔2
(1)
≤ 0: a fixed number of students; 
𝑔3
(1)
≤ 0: a fix salary budget which is linked to total working hours. 
 
2) The three faculties (followers): 
Science Faculty: Objective 𝑓1
(2)
 is to maximize the faculty‟s research budget 
from the university.  
Variables: 𝑦 = (𝑦1,𝑦2): 
𝑦1: the points granted to reward publication; 
𝑦2: the points granted to reward the securing of research grant income; 
Informatics Faculty: Objective𝑓2
(2)
is to maximize the research budget from the 
university. 
Variable: 
𝑧: how much is used to encourage publication; 
Business Faculty: Objective𝑓3
(2)
 is to maximize its research quantum by using 
the research budget from the university. It is developing a working load policy to 
reduce the teaching load for researchers who have a high research quantum; 
Variable: 
𝑤: how many points of research quantum per $ of research budget?  
 
3) The five departments in the three faculties (bottom followers): 
Objectives 𝑓𝑖𝑗
(3)
, 𝑖 = 1,2,3, 𝑗 = 1,2 : all departments have the same objective, 
that is, to maximize the department‟s research performance; 
Constraints 𝑔𝑖𝑗
(3)
, 𝑖 = 1,2,3, 𝑗 = 1,2: departments‟ constraints respectively; 
Variables: a, b, c, d, and e  are variables of the five departments respectively. 
Clearly, this TLMF decision case meets the features of S28 in Table 6.1.We 
give this case‟s TLMF model as follows: 
max
𝑥
𝑓 1  𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑦1,𝑦2, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒  University level  
  s.t. 𝑔 1  𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑦1,𝑦2, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒 ≤ 0, 
         max
𝑦
𝑓1
 2 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑦1,𝑦2,𝑎) (Science faculty) 




  s.t. 𝑔1
 2 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑦1,𝑦2,𝑎) ≤ 0, 
      max
𝑎
𝑓1
 3 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑦1,𝑦2,𝑎) (Mathematics department) 
s.t. 𝑔1




 2 (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑧, 𝑏, 𝑐) (Informatics faculty) 
  s.t. 𝑔2
 2 (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑧, 𝑏, 𝑐) ≤ 0, 
                 max
𝑏
𝑓21
 3  𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑧, 𝑏 (Soft− Eng department) 
s.t. 𝑔21
 3 (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑧, 𝑏) ≤ 0, 
              max
𝑐
𝑓22
 3 (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑧, 𝑐) (Inf− Sys department) 
s.t. 𝑔22




 2 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒) (Business faculty) 
 s.t. 𝑔3
 2 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒) ≤ 0, 
        max
𝑑
𝑓31
 3 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑤,𝑑) (Acc. department) 
s.t. 𝑔31
 3 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑤,𝑑) ≤ 0, 
                max
𝑒
𝑓32
 3 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑤, 𝑒) (Finance department) 
s.t. 𝑔32
 3 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑤, 𝑒) ≤ 0, 
where 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ 𝑅  are the decision variables of the university; 𝑦1,𝑦2 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑧 ∈
𝑅,𝑤 ∈ 𝑅  are of the three faculties respectively, 𝑎,𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒 ∈ 𝑅 are of the five 
departments respectively, and 𝑋 =   𝑥1, 𝑥2 |𝑥1 > 0, 𝑥2 > 0 ,𝑌 =  (𝑦1,𝑦2)|𝑦1 >
0,𝑦2>0,𝑍=𝑧|𝑧>0, 𝑊=𝑤|𝑤>0, 𝐴=𝑎|𝑎>0, 𝐵=𝑏|𝑏>0, 𝐶=𝑐|𝑐>0, 𝐷=𝑑|𝑑>0, 
𝐸 =  𝑒|𝑒 > 0 . As there is a secondary leadership relationship, both objective 
functions max𝑥 𝑓
 1 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑦1,𝑦2, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒) and 
constraint 𝑔 1 (𝑥1, 𝑥2,𝑦1,𝑦2, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒) ≤ 0  of the university include the 
decision variables of departments a, b, c, d, e. Similarly, by the secondary 
followership, 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2)  is included in all departments‟ objectives and 
constraints. 




6.5.2 Case 2: S27 Model 
Figure 6.11 Case 2 of the university research development strategy-making  
In this case, we suppose that all three faculties have uncooperative relationships 
and all the departments of each faculty have reference-uncooperative relationships. 
As in Case 1, the university takes into account the reactions of the faculties and of 
all departments. These departments fully consider both their faculty‟s and the 
university‟s strategies. From the TLMF decision framework in Table 1, this case 
refers to situation S27 and is described by DERD in Figure 6.11. 
We suppose that the variables, objectives and constraints of decision entities in 
this case are the same as those of Case 1. This case‟s TLMF decision model is 
written as follows: 
                             max
𝑥
𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒  
        s.t. 𝑔 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒 ≤ 0, 
                max
𝑦
𝑓1
 2 (𝑥,𝑦,𝑎) 
       s.t. 𝑔1
 2 (𝑥,𝑦,𝑎) ≤ 0, 
          max
𝑎
𝑓1
 3 (𝑥,𝑦,𝑎) 
   s.t. 𝑔1
 3 (𝑥,𝑦,𝑎) ≤ 0, 
                                    max
𝑧
𝑓2
 2 (𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑏, 𝑐) 
    s.t. 𝑔2
 2 (𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑏, 𝑐) ≤ 0, 
                                           max
𝑏
𝑓21
 3  𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑏, 𝑐  
  s.t. 𝑔21
 3 (𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑏, 𝑐) ≤ 0, 
                                           max
𝑐
𝑓22
 3  𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑏, 𝑐  
   s.t. 𝑔22
 3 (𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑏, 𝑐) ≤ 0, 
University  
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                                      max
𝑤
𝑓3
 2  𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒  
    s.t. 𝑔3
 2 (𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒) ≤ 0, 
                                             max
𝑑
𝑓31
 3 (𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒) 
  s.t. 𝑔31
 3 (𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒) ≤ 0, 
                                             max
𝑒
𝑓32
 3  𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒  
  s.t. 𝑔32
 3 (𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒) ≤ 0. 
As there is a secondary leadership relationship, the university‟s objective 
function 𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒  and constraint 𝑔 1 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒) 
include the variables of departments 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒 . Similarly, by the secondary 
followership, 𝑥  is included in all departments‟ objectives and constraints. As 
departments take into account their neighborhood decisions (reference-
uncooperative), we have variable 𝑑in the objective 𝑓32
 3 (𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒) and constraint 
𝑔32
 3 (𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒)  of departments 𝐸 , and 𝑒  in the objective 𝑓31
 3 (𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒)  and 
constraint 𝑔31
 3 (𝑥,𝑤,𝑑, 𝑒) of departments 𝐷. 
6.5.3 Case 3: S54 Model 
Figure 6.12 Case 3 of the university research development strategy-making 
In this case, all three faculties have a reference-uncooperative relationship and all 
the departments of each faculty have a semi-cooperative relationship. Unlike Case 
2, the university does not take the departments‟ decisions directly into account, 
nor do all departments directly consider the university‟s research strategies during 
their decision process. It can be seen from Table 6.1 that this relates to situation 
S54. This problem‟s DERD is shown in Figure 6.12. We use the same notations of 
variables, objectives and constraints used in Case 1, but the Departments of Soft 
Eng. and Inf. Sys share variables b, and the Departments of Acc. and Finance 
share variables e. We have this case‟s TLMF decision model as follows: 
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                         max
𝑥
𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤  
    s.t. 𝑔 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤 ≤ 0, 
           max
𝑦
𝑓1
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎) 
  s.t. 𝑔1
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎) ≤ 0, 
     max
𝑎
𝑓1
 3 (𝑦,𝑎) 
                           s.t. 𝑔1
 3 (𝑦,𝑎) ≤ 0, 
                               max
𝑧
𝑓2
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤, 𝑏) 
s.t. 𝑔2
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤, 𝑏) ≤ 0, 
                                      max
𝑏
𝑓21
 3  𝑧, 𝑏  
                                  s.t. 𝑔21
 3 (𝑧,𝑏) ≤ 0, 
                                       max
𝑐
𝑓22
 3  𝑧, 𝑏  
s.t. 𝑔22
 3 (𝑧, 𝑏) ≤ 0, 
                                  max
  𝑤
𝑓3
 2  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑑  
s.t. 𝑔3
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑑) ≤ 0, 
                                         max
𝑑
𝑓31
 3 (𝑤,𝑑) 
                                     s.t. 𝑔31
 3 (𝑤,𝑑) ≤ 0, 
                                         max
𝑒
𝑓32
 3  𝑤, 𝑒  
                                     s.t. 𝑔32
 3 (𝑤, 𝑒) ≤ 0. 
As these faculties have a reference-cooperative relationship, their variables 𝑦, 
𝑧,𝑤  are included in all faculties‟ objective and constraints such as 
𝑓1
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎) and 𝑔1
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑤,𝑎) . To describe the semi-cooperative 
relationship between departments, we have 𝑓2𝑖
 3 (𝑧, 𝑏)  and 𝑓3𝑖
 3 (𝑤,𝑑)  where 
variables 𝑏,𝑑  are shared by two departments respectively. This case has no 
secondary relationships, so 𝑥 is not included in department functions and 𝑎, 𝑏,𝑑 
are not included in the university‟s objective function.  




6.5.4 Case 4: Hybrid of S41, S45 and S48 Models 
Figure 6.13 Case 4 of the university research development strategies making 
In this case, the three faculties have a semi-cooperative relationship by sharing the 
same variable 𝑦.The departments have different relationships in different faculties. 
In the Science Faculty, the Math department has a second followership 
relationship with the university. In the Informatics Faculty, the two departments 
have a cooperative relationship and no secondary relationship. Two departments in 
the Business Faculty have an uncooperative relationship and no secondary 
relationship. The three different situations refer to S41, S45, and S48 respectively. 
This is a hybrid TLMF decision problem. Figure 6.13 describes its DERD. By 
using the same variables, objectives and constraints of decision entities used in 
previous cases, we have the following TLMF decision model:  
                              max
𝑥
𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦  
         s.t. 𝑔 1  𝑥,𝑦 ≤ 0, 
                 max
𝑦
𝑓1
 2 (𝑥,𝑦,𝑎) 
       s.t. 𝑔1
 2 (𝑥,𝑦,𝑎) ≤ 0, 
          max
𝑎
𝑓1
 3 (𝑥,𝑦,𝑎) 
   s.t. 𝑔1
 3 (𝑥,𝑦,𝑎) ≤ 0, 
                                     max
𝑦
𝑓2
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑏) 
     s.t. 𝑔2
 2 (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑏) ≤ 0, 
                                            max
𝑏
𝑓21
 3  𝑦, 𝑏  
  s.t. 𝑔21
 3 (𝑦, 𝑏) ≤ 0, 
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                                    max
  𝑦
𝑓3
 2  𝑥,𝑦,𝑑, 𝑒  
  s.t. 𝑔3
 2 (𝑥,𝑦,𝑑, 𝑒) ≤ 0, 
                                           max
𝑑
𝑓31
 3 (𝑦,𝑑) 
 s.t. 𝑔31
 3 (𝑦,𝑑) ≤ 0, 
                                            max
𝑒
𝑓32
 3  𝑦, 𝑒  
                                       s.t. 𝑔32
 3 (𝑦, 𝑒) ≤ 0. 
We can see that these three faculties share the same variable 𝑦  but have 
individual objectives. To describe the cooperative relationship between the 
departments in the Informatics Faculty, the two departments share variable b, 
objective function 𝑓21
 3 (𝑧, 𝑏) and constraint 𝑔21
 3 (𝑧, 𝑏) . To describe the 
uncooperative relationship in the Faculty of Business, its two departments‟ 
objective functions 𝑓31
 3 (𝑦,𝑑) and 𝑓32
 3 (𝑦, 𝑒), have individual variables. As only 
the Math Department has a secondary relationship with the university level, x is 
only included in the Math Department‟s functions.  
Through these four cases, we present a way to model real-world TLMF 
decision problems by both DERD and programming approaches. 
6.6 Tri-level Decision Solution Methods 
This section focuses on a linear version of tri-level decision problems with a 
single decision entity at each level. 
6.6.1 Solution Concepts 
According to the basic tri-level decision model (6.1) in a one-level one-entity 
situation, we present a linear tri-level programming (decision model) as follows. 
For 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑛 ,𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 ⊂ 𝑅𝑚 , 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 ⊂ 𝑅𝑝 , 𝑓 1 ,𝑓 2 ,𝑓 3 :𝑋 × 𝑌 × 𝑍 ⟶ 𝑅, 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 = 𝛼1𝑥 + 𝛽1𝑦 + 𝜇1𝑧 
s.t. 𝐴1𝑥 + 𝐵1𝑦 + 𝐶1𝑧 ≤ 𝑏1, 
                min
𝑦∈𝑌
𝑓 2  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 = 𝛼2𝑥 + 𝛽2𝑦 + 𝜇2𝑧 
s.t. 𝐴2𝑥 + 𝐵2𝑦 + 𝐶2𝑧 ≤ 𝑏2, 
                                    min
𝑧∈𝑍
𝑓 3  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 = 𝛼3𝑥 + 𝛽3𝑦 + 𝜇3𝑧 
s.t. 𝐴3𝑥 + 𝐵3𝑦 + 𝐶3𝑧 ≤ 𝑏3,                          (6.12) 
where 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑛 ,𝛽𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑚 , 𝜇𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑝 , 𝑏𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑞𝑖 ,𝐴𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑞𝑖×𝑛 ,𝐵𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑞𝑖×𝑚 ,𝐶𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑞𝑖×𝑝 , 




𝑖 = 1,2,3. 
The variables 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧  are called the top-level, middle-level, and bottom-level 
variables respectively, and 𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 , 𝑓 2  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ,𝑓 3  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧  the top-level, 
middle-level, and bottom-level objective functions, respectively. In this model, the 
decision problem consists of three optimization sub-problems (represented by 
three objective functions) in a three-level hierarchy. Each level has individual 
control variables, but also takes account of other levels in its optimization function. 
To obtain an optimal solution to the Linear Tri-level Programming (LTLP) 
problem (6.12) based on the solution concept of bi-level programming (Bard 
1998), a solution definition is first proposed as follows: 
 
Definition6.1 
(a) Constraint region of the LTLP: 
𝑆 = { 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 |𝑥 ∈ 𝑋,𝑦 ∈ 𝑌, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍,𝐴𝑖𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑦 + 𝐶𝑖𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2,3}. 
(b) Constraint region of the middle level for each fixed 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋: 
𝑆(𝑥) = { 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑌 × 𝑍|𝐵𝑖𝑦 + 𝐶𝑖𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 − 𝐴𝑖𝑥, 𝑖 = 2,3}. 
(c) Feasible set for the bottom level for each fixed  𝑥,𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 × 𝑌: 
𝑆 𝑥,𝑦 =  𝑧 ∈ 𝑍|𝐶3𝑧 ≤ 𝑏3 − 𝐴3𝑥 − 𝐵3𝑦 . 
(d) Projection of S onto the top level‟s decision space: 
𝑆 𝑋 =  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋|∃ 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑌 × 𝑍,  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 . 
(e) Projection of S onto the top and middle levels‟ decision space: 
𝑆 𝑋,𝑌 =   𝑥,𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 × 𝑌|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑍,  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 . 
(f) Rational reaction set of the bottom level for  𝑥,𝑦 ∈ 𝑆(𝑋,𝑌): 
𝑃 𝑥,𝑦 =  𝑧|𝑧 ∈ arg min⁡[𝑓3 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 |𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 𝑥,𝑦  . 
(g) Rational reaction set for the middle level for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 𝑋 : 
𝑃 𝑥 = { 𝑦, 𝑧 | 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ arg min⁡[𝑓2 𝑥,𝑦 , 𝑧 |(𝑦 , 𝑧 ) ∈ 𝑆 𝑥 , 
𝑧 ∈ 𝑃 𝑥,𝑦  ]}. 
(h) Inducible region (IR): 
𝐼𝑅 =   𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 | 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆,  𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑃 𝑥  . 
Therefore, problem (6.12) is equivalent to the following problem: 
min 𝑓1 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 | 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐼𝑅 .                                       (6.13) 




6.6.2 Theoretical Properties 




(1) 𝑆 is non-empty and compact. 
(2) IR is non-empty. 
(3) 𝑃 𝑥 and 𝑃 𝑥,𝑦 are point-to-point maps with respect to 𝑥  and  𝑥,𝑦  
respectively. 
 
Three important LTLP theorems are proposed here. Theorem 6.1 proves the 
existence of an optimal solution of the LTLP model. Theorem 6.2 presents a way 
to obtain a solution to the LTLP problem. Theorem 6.3 provides the necessary 
foundations for developing a tri-level 𝐾th-Best algorithm. 
 
Theorem 6.1 If the above assumptions are satisfied, there exists an optimal 
solution to the linear tri-level decision model (6.13). 
 
Proof: Since neither S or IR is empty, there is at least one parameter value 
𝑥∗ ∈ 𝑆(𝑋) and 𝑃 𝑥∗ ≠ ∅. Consider a sequence  (𝑥𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡 , 𝑧𝑡) 𝑡=1
∞ ⊆ 𝐼𝑅 converging 
to (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧∗). Then, by the well-known results of linear parametric optimization, 
(𝑦∗, 𝑧∗) ∈ 𝑃 𝑥∗ . Hence, (𝑥∗,𝑦1
∗,… ,𝑦𝑘
∗) ∈ 𝐼𝑅  that shows IR is closed. By 
Assumption 6.1(1) and 𝐼𝑅 ⊆ 𝑆 , IR is also bounded. IR is non-empty, so the 
problem (6.13) consists of minimizing a continuous function over a compact non-
empty set, which implies that the problem has an optimal solution. 
 
Theorem 6.2 The inducible region can be written equivalently as a piecewise 
linear equality constraint comprised of support hyper-planes of 𝑆. 
 
Proof: Using the notations in the proof of Theorem 6.1, the inducible region 𝐼𝑅 
can be rewritten as follows: 
𝐼𝑅 = { 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆|𝛽2𝑦 + 𝜇2𝑧 = min 𝛽2𝑦 + 𝜇2𝑧 |𝐵𝑖𝑦 + 𝐶𝑖𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 − 𝐴𝑖𝑥,𝑦 ≥ 0,
  𝑧≥0,𝑖=2,3,𝜇3𝑧=min𝜇3z|𝐶3z≤𝑏3−𝐴3𝑥−𝐵3𝑦, z≥0}.    (6.14) 
Let   
Q 𝑥 = min[ 𝛽2𝑦 + 𝜇2𝑧 |(𝑦 , 𝑧 ) ∈ 𝑆 𝑥 , 𝑧 ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛⁡[ 𝜇3𝑧 |𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 𝑥,𝑦  ]],      (6.15) 
𝑄 𝑥,𝑦 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜇3𝑧 |𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 𝑥,𝑦  .                             (6.16) 
It is then necessary to prove that 𝑄 𝑥  is a piecewise linear equality constraint.  




According to the expressions for 𝑄 𝑥  and 𝑄 𝑥,𝑦 , the first step is to prove 
that 𝑄 𝑥,𝑦  is a piecewise linear equality constraint for any given 𝑥  and 𝑦 . 
Because 𝑄 𝑥,𝑦  can be seen as a linear programming problem with parameters 𝑥 
and y, the dual problem of 𝑄 𝑥,𝑦  is 
max{𝑢 𝐴3𝑥 + 𝐵3𝑦−𝑏3 |𝑢𝐶3 ≥ −𝜇3,𝑢 ≥ 0}.                   (6.17) 
This problem has the same optimal values as 𝑄 𝑥,𝑦  at the solution 𝑢∗ . Let 
𝑢1,… ,𝑢𝑡  be a listing of all the vertices of the constraint region of the dual problem 
given by 𝑈 = {𝑢|𝑢𝐶3 ≥ −𝜇3}. Because a solution of the dual problem occurs at a 
vertex of 𝑈, the equivalent problem is 
max 𝑢 𝐴3𝑥 + 𝐵3𝑦 − 𝑏3 |𝑢 ∈  𝑢
1,… ,𝑢𝑡  .                     (6.18) 
This means that 𝑄 𝑥,𝑦  is a piecewise linear function.  
Next, it will be proved that 𝑄 𝑥  is a piecewise linear function. Suppose that 
𝑧1, 𝑧2,… , 𝑧𝑠  are solutions of problem 𝑄 𝑥,𝑦 . For each 𝑧𝑖 , 𝑄 𝑥  becomes a 
programming problem with parameters 𝑥  and 𝑧𝑖 . Therefore, there are 𝑠 
parameterized programming problems, 𝑄 𝑥 |𝑧1 ,… ,𝑄 𝑥 |𝑧𝑠 . Similarly, each 
𝑄 𝑥 |𝑧 𝑖  is a piecewise linear function. Hence, the set IR can be rewritten as 
𝐼𝑅 =  { 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖 |𝛽2𝑦 = 𝑄 𝑥 |𝑧 𝑖 − 𝜇2𝑧
𝑖}𝑠𝑖=1                    (6.19) 
which is a piecewise linear equality constraint. 
 
Corollary 6.1 A solution to the LTLP problem (6.12) occurs at a vertex of the 𝐼𝑅. 
 
Theorem 6.3 The solution (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧∗) of the linear tri-level programming problem 
occurs at a vertex of 𝑆. 
 
Proof: Let  𝑥1,𝑦1, 𝑧1 ,… , (𝑥𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡 , 𝑧𝑡) be the distinct vertices of 𝑆. Because any 
point in 𝑆  can be written as a convex combination of these vertices, let 
 𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧∗ =  𝛿𝑖(𝑥
𝑖 ,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖)𝑡 𝑖=1 , where  𝛿𝑖
𝑡 
𝑖=1 = 1,𝛿𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑡  and 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡. 
It must be shown that 𝑡 = 1. Let us write the constraints of (6.12) at (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧∗) in 
their piecewise linear form (6.19): 
                           0 = 𝑄 𝑥∗ |𝑧∗ − 𝛽2𝑦
∗ − 𝜇2𝑧
∗ 





































by the convexity of 𝑄(𝑥). However, by definition𝑄 𝑥𝑖 |𝑧∗, 
𝑄 𝑥𝑖 |𝑧∗ = min
 𝑦 ,𝑧 ∈𝑆 𝑥 𝑖 
𝑧∈𝑝(𝑥 𝑖 ,𝑦)
(𝛽2𝑦 + 𝜇2𝑧) ≤𝛽2𝑦
𝑖 + 𝜇2𝑧
𝑖 . 
Therefore, 𝑄 𝑥𝑖 |𝑧∗ − 𝛽2𝑦
𝑖 − 𝜇2𝑧
𝑖 ≤ 0, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑡 . Noting that 𝛿𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 =
1,… , 𝑡 , the equality in the preceding expression must hold, or else a contradiction 
would result in the sequence above. Consequently, 𝑄 𝑥𝑖 |𝑧∗ − 𝛽2𝑦
𝑖 − 𝜇2𝑧
𝑖 = 0 
for all 𝑖 . These statements imply that  𝑥𝑖 ,𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑅, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑡 , and that 
(𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧∗) can be written as a convex combination of points in the IR. Because 
(𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧∗) a vertex of the 𝐼𝑅 by Corollary 6.1 and 𝑃(𝑥) and 𝑃(𝑥, y) are single-
valued, a contradiction results unless 𝑡 = 1. 
 
Corollary 6.2 If (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧) is a vertex of 𝐼𝑅, then it is also a vertex of 𝑆. 
6.6.3 Tri-level Kth-Best Algorithm 
This section will introduce the tri-level Kth-Best algorithm for solving the linear 
tri-level programming problem (6.12). 
Theorem 6.3 in Section 6.6.2 provides a theoretical foundation and a suitable 
way to solve problem (6.12). Therefore, it is necessary only to search the extreme 
points of the constraint region 𝑆 to find an optimal solution for the LTLP problem 
(6.12). The main principle of the tri-level Kth-Best algorithm is shown as follows. 
Consider the linear programming problem below: 
min 𝛼1𝑥 + 𝛽1𝑦 + 𝜇1𝑧| 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 .                              (6.20) 
The N-ranked basic feasible solutions to (6.20) are: 
 𝑥[1],𝑦[1], 𝑧[1] ,  𝑥[2],𝑦[2], 𝑧[2] ,… ,  𝑥[𝑁],𝑦[𝑁], 𝑧[𝑁] , 
such that 𝛼1𝑥[𝑖] + 𝛽1𝑦[𝑖] + 𝜇1𝑧[𝑖] ≤ 𝛼1𝑥 𝑖+1 + 𝛽1𝑦 𝑖+1 + 𝜇1𝑧 𝑖+1 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 − 1. Then 
solving the problem (6.12) is equivalent to finding the index 
𝐾∗ = min{𝑖 ∈  1,⋯𝑁 | 𝑥[𝑖], 𝑦[𝑖], 𝑧[𝑖] ∈ 𝐼𝑅}. 
Therefore, a global solution is 𝑥[𝐾∗], 𝑦[𝐾∗], 𝑧[𝐾∗] . Similarly, for fixing 𝑥 = 𝑥[𝑖], we 
have the middle-level and bottom-level problem (6.21) as follows: 
min
𝑦∈𝑌
𝛽2𝑦 + 𝜇2𝑧                      
s.t. 𝐴2𝑥 + 𝐵2𝑦 + 𝐶2𝑧 ≤ 𝑏2,                                 (6.21) 




                                                            min
𝑧∈𝑍
𝜇3𝑧 
s.t. 𝐴3𝑥 + 𝐵3𝑦 + 𝐶3𝑧 ≤ 𝑏3. 
Clearly, problem (6.21) is a general bi-level programming scenario which has 
been discussed in Chapter 3. We can use the Kth-Best algorithm, the Kuhn-Tucker 
approach or the Branch-and-bound algorithm to solve this problem.  
The procedure of the tri-level Kth-Best algorithm is described as follows: 
 
Algorithm 6.1: Tri-level Kth-Best Algorithm 
[Begin] 
Step 1: Set 𝑖 ← 1. Solve problem (6.20) using the simplex method to obtain 
the optimal solution,  𝑥[1],𝑦[1], 𝑧[1] . Let 𝑊 = { 𝑥[1],𝑦[1], 𝑧[1] }  and 𝑇 = ∅ . 
Go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Treat the problem as a top- (middle-, bottom-) level problem. This step 
is equivalent to solving the follower‟s (middle-, bottom-) decision problem 
(6.21) for 𝑥 = 𝑥[𝑖]. Let  𝑦 , 𝑧  denote the optimal solution to (6.21). If 𝑦 = 𝑦[𝑖] 
and 𝑧 = 𝑧[𝑖], stop, and  𝑥[𝑖],𝑦[𝑖], 𝑧[𝑖]  is the globally optimal solution of (6.12) 
with 𝐾∗ = 𝑖; otherwise, go to Step 3. 
Step 3: Let 𝑊[𝑖]  denote the set of adjacent vertices of  𝑥[𝑖],𝑦[𝑖], 𝑧[𝑖]  such 
that  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑊[𝑖] implies 𝛼1𝑥 + 𝛽1𝑦 + 𝜇1𝑧 ≥ 𝛼1𝑥[𝑖] + 𝛽1𝑦[𝑖] + 𝜇1𝑧[𝑖] . Let 
𝑇 = 𝑇 ∪   𝑥 𝑖 ,𝑦 𝑖 , 𝑧 𝑖    and 𝑊 = (𝑊 ∪𝑊[𝑖])\𝑇. Go to Step 4. 
Step 4: Set 𝑖 ← 𝑖 + 1 and choose  𝑥[𝑖],𝑦[𝑖], 𝑧[𝑖]  so that 
𝛼1𝑥[𝑖] + 𝛽1𝑦[𝑖] + 𝜇1𝑧[𝑖] = min{𝛼1𝑥 + 𝛽1𝑦 + 𝜇1𝑧| 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑊}. 
Go to Step 2.  
 [End] 
 
The tri-level Kth-Best algorithm uses two sub-algorithms: (1) the simplex 
algorithm, which can obtain an optimal solution for a linear programming problem, 
and (2) the algorithm for finding the adjacent vertices of a selected vertex. 
According to the results given by Bard (1984), a vertex is a geometrical 
interpretation of a feasible solution. Hence, enumerating the adjacent vertices is 
equivalent to enumerating all the basic feasible solutions for the decision problem.  
6.6.4 A Numerical Example 
We give an example to illustrate how the tri-level Kth-Best algorithm can be used 
to solve a tri-level decision problem. 




Example 6.2 For 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 =  𝑥 𝑥 ≥ 0 ,𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 =  𝑦 𝑦 ≥ 0 , 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 = {𝑧|𝑧 ≥ 0},  
𝑓(1),𝑓(2),𝑓(3):𝑋 × 𝑌 × 𝑍 → 𝑅, 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓(1) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 2𝑧 
                  s.t. 2𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧 ≥ 14, 
min
𝑦∈𝑌
𝑓(2) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 3𝑧           
                                       s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 4, 
                 𝑦 ≤ 6, 
        min
𝑧∈𝑍
𝑓(3) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 − 𝑧 
                    s.t. 𝑦 + 𝑧 ≤ 8, 
                                                    𝑦 + 4𝑧 ≥ 8, 
                                                    𝑦 + 2𝑧 ≤ 13. 
Now it is possible to use the tri-level Kth-Best algorithm to obtain a solution 
for this problem. According to the tri-level Kth-Best algorithm, solving this 
problem first requires consideration of the middle level and the bottom level as a 
whole (middle, bottom) and then solving the problem using the bi-level Kth-Best 
algorithm. 
From (6.20), let us consider a linear programming problem as follows: 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓(1) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 2𝑧 
                                s.t. 2𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧 ≥ 14, 
      𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 4, 
          𝑦 ≤ 6, 
                                      𝑦 + 𝑧 ≤ 8, 
                                      𝑦 + 4𝑧 ≥ 8, 
                                      𝑦 + 2𝑧 ≤ 13. 
Now we go through the tri-level Kth-Best algorithm from Step 1 to Step 4. 
Step 1: Set 𝑖 ← 1. Solve the above problem using the simplex method to obtain 
the optimal solution,  𝑥[1],𝑦[1], 𝑧[1] = (6,0,2) . Let 𝑊 = { 𝑥[1],𝑦[1], 𝑧[1] }  and 
𝑇 = ∅. Go to Step 2. 
Step 2: By the problem (6.21), we have the problem: 
 
 






𝑓(2) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 − 𝑧 
                        s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 4, 
          𝑦 ≤ 6, 
                                       𝑥 = 6, 
      min
𝑧∈𝑍
𝑓(3) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 − 𝑧 
                                       s.t. 𝑦 + 𝑧 ≤ 8, 
     𝑦 + 4𝑧 ≥ 8, 
     𝑦 + 2𝑧 ≤ 13, 
                                             𝑥 = 6. 
Using the bi-level Kth-Best algorithm, we have  𝑦 [1], 𝑧 [1] =  6,2 ≠
 𝑦 1 , 𝑧 1   and go to Step 3. 
Step 3: Find the adjacent vertices of  𝑥[1],𝑦[1], 𝑧[1] and we have 𝑊[1] =
{ 3.75,6,0.5 , (4,0,6)}, T={(6,0,2)} and W=  3.75,6,0.5 ,  4,0,6  . Go to Step 4. 
Step 4: Update i=i+1, choose  𝑥[2],𝑦[2], 𝑧[2] = (3.75,6,0.5) and go back to 
Step 2. 
Step 2: By the problem (6.21), we have the problem: 
min
𝑦∈𝑌
𝑓(2) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 − 𝑧 
                               s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 4, 
                                 𝑦 ≤ 6, 
                                     𝑥 = 3.75, 
min
𝑧∈𝑍
𝑓(3) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 − 𝑧 
                                    s.t. 𝑦 + 𝑧 ≤ 8, 
                                          𝑦 + 4𝑧 ≥ 8, 
                                          𝑦 + 2𝑧 ≤ 13, 
                                          𝑥 = 3.75. 
Using the bi-level Kth-Best algorithm, we have  𝑦 [2], 𝑧 [2] =  6,2 ≠
 𝑦 2 , 𝑧 2   and go to Step 3. 
Step 3: Find the adjacent vertices of  𝑥[2],𝑦[2], 𝑧[2]  and we have 𝑊[2] =
{(3,6,2)}, T={(6,0,2),(3.75,6,0.5)} and 𝑊 =   4,0,6 , (3,6,2) . Go to Step 4. 
Step 4: Update i=i+1, choose  𝑥[3],𝑦[3], 𝑧[3] = (3,6,2) and go back to Step 2. 




Step 2: By the problem (6.21), we have the problem: 
min
𝑦∈𝑌
𝑓(2) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 − 𝑧 
                        s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 4, 
         𝑦 ≤ 6, 
                                      𝑥 = 3, 
     min
𝑧∈𝑍
𝑓(3) = 𝑥 + 𝑦 − 𝑧 
                s.t. 𝑦 + 𝑧 ≤ 8, 
     𝑦 + 4𝑧 ≥ 8, 
     𝑦 + 2𝑧 ≤ 13, 
                                             𝑥 = 3. 
Using the bi-level Kth-Best algorithm, we have  𝑦 [3], 𝑧 [3] =  6,2 =
 𝑦 3 , 𝑧 3  . Therefore,  𝑥[3],𝑦[3], 𝑧[3]  is an optimal solution of Example 6.2 with 
𝐾∗ = 𝑖 = 3 . For the global solution, the objective value of 𝑓1  is 13, and the 
objective function values of 𝑓2  and 𝑓3  are 15 and 7 respectively. Therefore, the 
Kth-Best algorithm provides an useful way to solve the linear tri-level decision 
problem. 
6.7 Tri-level Multi-follower Decision Solution Methods 
We have proposed 64 kinds of TLMF decision model and this section aims to 
present solution methods for these models. We take the TLMF decision model 
S12 in its linear version as representative, to illustrate solution concepts and 
theoretical properties, and describe a TLMF Kth-Best algorithm for TLMF 
decision. 
6.7.1 Solution Concepts 
According to the general modelS12shownin Section 6.4, the model in linear 
version can be expressed as follows. 
For 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 ⊂ 𝑅𝑘 ,  𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑘0 ,  𝑌 = 𝑌1 ∩⋯∩ 𝑌𝑛 ,  𝑦 ∈ 𝑌,  𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑘𝑖𝑗 , 
𝑓(1):𝑋 × 𝑌 × 𝑍11 × ⋯𝑍1𝑚1 × ⋯× 𝑍𝑛1 × ⋯× 𝑍𝑛𝑚𝑛 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖
 2 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖1 × ⋯ 
× 𝑍𝑖𝑚 𝑖 → 𝑅, 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3 :𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖𝑗 → 𝑅, and 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, 
 
















𝑖=1  ≤ 𝑏,                                                         (6.22b) 
where  (𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) (𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛)  is the solution to the ith middle-level 




 2  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖𝑥 + 𝑑𝑖𝑦 + 𝑔𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1
                        (6.22c) 
           s.t. 𝐴𝑖𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑦 +  𝐷𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1  ≤ 𝑏𝑖 ,                                                   (6.22d) 
where  𝑧𝑖𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖) is the solution to the ith middle-level follower‟s jth 




 3  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖𝑗  = 𝑐𝑖𝑗 𝑥 + 𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑦 + 𝑕𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗                                            (6.22e) 
s.t. 𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑦 + 𝐸𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗  ≤ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ,                                                           (6.22f) 
where 𝑐, 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅
𝑘 ,𝑑,𝑑𝑖 ,𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅
𝑘0 , 𝑒𝑖𝑗 ,𝑔𝑖𝑗 ,𝑕𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅
𝑘𝑖𝑗 ,𝐴 ∈ 𝑅𝑠×𝑘 ,𝐴𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠𝑖×𝑘 ,  
𝐴𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠𝑖𝑗 ×𝑘 ,𝐵 ∈ 𝑅𝑠×𝑘0 ,𝐵𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠𝑖×𝑘0 ,𝐵𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠𝑖𝑗 ×𝑘0 ,𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠×𝑘𝑖𝑗 ,𝐷𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠𝑖×𝑘𝑖𝑗 , 
𝐸𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠𝑖𝑗 ×𝑘𝑖𝑗 ,𝑏 ∈ 𝑅𝑠 , 𝑏𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠𝑖 ,𝑏𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅
𝑠𝑖𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛. 
 
To find an optimal solution for the decision model, relevant solution concepts 




(a) Constraint region of the TLMF decision model: 
        𝑆 = { 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛  ∈ 𝑋 × 𝑌 × 𝑍11 × ⋯𝑍1𝑚1 × ⋯× 




𝑖=1  ≤ 𝑏, 
                   𝐴𝑖𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑦 +  𝐷𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1  ≤ 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑗 𝑦 + 𝐸𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗  ≤ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 , 
           𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛}. 
(b) Constraint region of the ith middle-level follower for each fixed 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋: 
          𝑆𝑖 𝑥 = {(𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ∈ 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑍𝑖1 × ⋯× 𝑍𝑖𝑚 𝑖 |𝐴𝑖𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑦 + 
                    𝐷𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1  ≤ 𝑏𝑖 ,𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑦 + 𝐸𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗  ≤ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖}. 
(c) Feasible set of the ith middle-level follower‟s jth bottom-level follower for 
each fixed (𝑥,𝑦) ∈ 𝑋 × 𝑌𝑖: 
𝑆𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦 = {𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 |𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑗 𝑦 + 𝐸𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗  ≤ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 }. 




(d) Projection of S onto the leader‟s decision space: 
𝑆 𝑋 = {𝑥 ∈ 𝑋|∃ 𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛  , 
                                       𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛  ∈ 𝑆}. 
(e) Projection of S onto the top-level leader‟s and the ith middle-level follower‟s 
decision space: 
𝑆𝑖 𝑋,𝑌 = { 𝑥,𝑦 |∃(𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ),         
                                           𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛  ∈ 𝑆}. 
(f) Rational reaction set of the ith middle-level follower‟s jth bottom-level 
follower for (𝑥,𝑦) ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑋,𝑌 : 
𝑃𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦 = {𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑖𝑗 |𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ argmin 𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 𝑖𝑗  : 𝑧 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦  }. 
(g) Rational reaction set of the ith middle-level follower for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 𝑋 : 
𝑃𝑖 𝑥 = { 𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 |(𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ∈ argmin[𝑓𝑖
 2  𝑥,𝑦 , 𝑧 𝑖1,… , 𝑧 𝑖𝑚 𝑖 | 
                 𝑦 , 𝑧 𝑖1,… , 𝑧 𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑥 , 𝑧 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦  , 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖]}. 
(h) Inducible region: 
  𝐼𝑅 = { 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛  | 
      𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛  ∈ 𝑆,  𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 𝑥 , 
     𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛}． 
Therefore, based on the notations, the TLMF decision model (6.22) can be 
written as: 
min
𝑥 ,𝑦 ,𝑧11 ,…,𝑧1𝑚 1 ,…,𝑧𝑛1 ,…,𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛   
s.t.  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛  ∈ 𝐼𝑅.                      (6.23) 
6.7.2 Theoretical Properties 
For the sake of assuring that an optimal solution to the model (6.22) exists, we 
give the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 6.2 
(1) S is non-empty and compact. 
(2) IR is non-empty. 
(3) 𝑃𝑖 𝑥  and 𝑃𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦  are point-to-point maps with respect to x and (𝑥,𝑦) 
respectively, where 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛. 
 




Theorem 6.4 If the TLMF decision model (6.22) meets Assumption 6.2, then 
there exists an optimal solution. 
 
Proof: Let  
𝑃(𝑥) = { 𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛  : (𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖) ∈ 𝑃𝑖 𝑥 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛}. 
Since neither S nor IR is empty, there is at least one parameter value 
𝑥∗ ∈ 𝑆 𝑋  and 𝑃 𝑥∗ ≠ ∅.   
Consider a sequence  (𝑥𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡 , 𝑧11
𝑡 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑡 ,…𝑧𝑛1




⊆ 𝐼𝑅 converging 
to (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧11
∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
∗ ). Then, by the well-known results of linear 
parametric optimization, we have (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧11
∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
∗ ) ∈ 𝑃 𝑥∗ . 
Hence, (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧11
∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
∗ ) ∈ 𝐼𝑅  which shows that IR is 
closed. By Assumption 6.2(1) and 𝐼𝑅 ⊆ 𝑆, IR is therefore also bounded, and IR is 
nonempty, so the problem (6.22) consists of minimizing a continuous function 
over a compact nonempty set, which implies that the problem has an optimal 
solution. 
 
Theorem 6.5 The inducible region IR can be expressed equivalently as a 
piecewise linear equality constraint comprised of supporting hyperplanes of S. 
 
Proof: First, denote the optimal value of the ith middle-level follower‟s jth 
bottom-level follower by 
𝐹𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦 = min 𝑕𝑖𝑗 𝑧 𝑖𝑗 |𝑧 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦  , 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, 
and define 
𝐹𝑖 𝑥 = min 𝑑𝑖𝑦 + 𝑔𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1
| 𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑥 ,
  
           𝑕𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦 , 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖}, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛. 
Since 𝐹𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦  can be seen as a linear programming problem with parameters 𝑥 
and𝑦, the dual problem of 𝐹𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦  can be written as 
max (𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑦 − 𝑏𝑖)𝑢𝑖𝑗 |𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑖𝑗 ≥ −𝑕𝑖𝑗 ,𝑢𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 .   (6.24) 
If both 𝐹𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦  and problem (6.24) have feasible solutions, by the dual theorem 
of linear programming, both have optimal solutions and the same optimal 
objective function value. Since a solution to problem (6.24) occurs at a vertex of 




express all the vertices of 𝑈𝑖𝑗 , then problem (6.24) can be written as: 
 max  (𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑦 − 𝑏𝑖)𝑢𝑖𝑗 |𝑢𝑖𝑗 ∈ {𝑢𝑖𝑗
1 ,… ,𝑢𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑖𝑗 } .    (6.25) 




Clearly, 𝐹𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦  is a piecewise linear function according to problem (6.25).  
Next, we prove that 𝐹𝑖 𝑥  is also a piecewise linear function. Assume that 
(𝑧𝑖1
1 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
1 ),… , (𝑧𝑖1
𝑝𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑝𝑖 )  are solutions to the problem 𝐹𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦  for 𝑖 =
1,… ,𝑛. For each fixed i and a solution (𝑧𝑖1
𝑡𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑡𝑖 ) where 𝑡𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑝𝑖 , 𝐹𝑖 𝑥  
becomes a programming problem with parameters 𝑥 and (𝑧𝑖1
𝑡𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑡𝑖 ), and there 
are 𝑝𝑖  parameterized programming problems such as 
𝐹𝑖 𝑥 |(𝑧𝑖1
1 ,…,𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
1 ),… ,𝐹𝑖 𝑥 |(𝑧𝑖1
𝑝𝑖 ,…,𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑝𝑖 )
. Considering different combinations of 
(𝑧𝑖1
𝑡𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑡𝑖 ) for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛,  there are  𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  parameterized programming 
problems 𝐹𝑖 𝑥 |(𝑧𝑖1
𝑡𝑖 ,…,𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑡𝑖 )
. Therefore, 𝐹𝑖 𝑥  is also a piecewise linear function as 
𝐹𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦 .  
Lastly, according to the above definition of 𝐹𝑖 𝑥 , the inducible regionIR can 
be rewritten as  
𝐼𝑅 = {(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11
𝑡1 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑡1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1
𝑡𝑛 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛




 = 𝐹𝑖 𝑥 |(𝑧𝑖1
𝑡𝑖 ,…,𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑡𝑖 )
, 𝑡𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛}.                             (6.26) 
and it can be seen as a piecewise linear equality constraint. 
 
Corollary 6.3 The TLMF decision model (6.22) is equivalent to optimizing𝑓(1) 
over a feasible region comprised of a piecewise linear equality constraint. 
 
Corollary 6.4 An optimal solution to the TLMF decision model (6.22) occurs at 
a vertex of IR. 
 
Proof: According to the equivalent form (6.23) of the TLMF decision model, 
and since 𝑓(1) is linear, an optimal solution to the problem must occur at a vertex 
of IR if it exists.  
 
Theorem 6.6 The optimal solution (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧11
∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
∗ )  to the 
TLMF decision model (6.22) occurs at a vertex of S. 
 
Proof: Let  𝑥1,𝑦1, 𝑧11
1 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
1 ,…𝑧𝑛1
1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
1  ,… , (𝑥𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡 , 𝑧11




𝑡 ) indicate the distinct vertices of S. Since any point in S can be written 
as a convex combination of these vertices, we have   
       (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧11
∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
∗ ) 
=  𝛿𝑟 𝑥
𝑟 ,𝑦𝑟 , 𝑧11
𝑟 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑟 ,…𝑧𝑛1




where  𝛿𝑟 = 1,
𝑡 
𝑟=1 𝛿𝑟 > 0, 𝑟 = 1,… , 𝑡  and 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡. 




We can write the constraints of (6.22) in the piecewise linear form (6.26) 
discussed in Theorem 6.6: 
  0 = 𝐹𝑖 𝑥
∗ |(𝑧𝑖1
∗ ,…,𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
∗ ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑦





















, 𝑖 = 1, . . ,𝑛. 
Because of the convexity of 𝐹𝑖 𝑥

























∗ ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑦𝑖




, 𝑖 = 1, . . ,𝑛.     (6.27) 
By the definition of 𝐹𝑖 𝑥 |(𝑧𝑖1
𝑡𝑖 ,…,𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑡𝑖 )
















∗ ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑟 − 𝑔𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑟 ≤ 0,
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1 𝑟 = 1,… , 𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1, . . ,𝑛. 




∗ ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑟 − 𝑔𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑟 ≤ 0,
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1 𝑟 = 1,… , 𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1, . . ,𝑛. 
These statements imply that  𝑥𝑟 ,𝑦𝑟 , 𝑧11
𝑟 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑟 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝑟 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝑟  ∈ 𝐼𝑅 , 𝑟 =
1,… , 𝑡 and that (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧11
∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
∗ ) can be denoted as a convex 
combination of the points in the IR. Since (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧11
∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
∗ ) is 
a vertex of the IR according to Corollary 6.4 and Assumption 6.2(3), there must 
exist 1t , which means (𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧11
∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
∗ ) is a vertex of S. 
 
Corollary 6.5 If  𝑥∗,𝑦∗, 𝑧11
∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
∗   is a vertex of the IR, it is 
also a vertex of S. 
6.7.3 TLMF Kth-Best Algorithm 
The above theorems and corollaries provide a theoretical foundation to extend the 
tri-level Kth-Best algorithm proposed in Section 6.6.3 for solving the TLMF 
decision problem (6.22). The main principle of the TLMF Kth-Best algorithm is 
showed as follows. 
 
 




First, consider the following linear programming problem: 
min
(𝑥 ,𝑦 ,𝑧11 ,…,𝑧1𝑚 1 ,…,𝑧𝑛1 ,…,𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 )∈𝑆




1 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
1 ,…𝑧𝑛1
1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
1  ,… , (𝑥𝑁 ,𝑦𝑁 , 𝑧11
𝑁 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑁 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝑁 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝑁 ) 
denote the N-ranked basic feasible solutions to (6.28), such that 
        𝑓 1  𝑥𝐾 ,𝑦𝐾 , 𝑧11
𝐾 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝐾 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝐾 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝐾   




𝐾+1 ,𝐾 = 1,… ,𝑁 − 1. 
Then solving the problem (6.28) is equivalent to searching the index 𝐾∗ =
min 𝐾 𝐾 ∈  1,… ,𝑁 ,  𝑥𝐾 ,𝑦𝐾 , 𝑧11
𝐾 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝐾 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝐾 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛






𝐾∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝐾∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝐾∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝐾∗   is the global solution to the TLMF 
problem. 





𝐾∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝐾∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝐾∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛




𝐾∗ ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝐾∗ ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝐾∗ ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝐾∗   by solving a set of uncooperative linear multi-
follower bi-level (MFBL) decision problems at the middle and bottom level, so 
next, for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛 and the fixing 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐾
∗





 2  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖𝑥 + 𝑑𝑖𝑦 + 𝑔𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1
                                  
                    s.t. 𝐴𝑖𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑦 +  𝐷𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1  ≤ 𝑏𝑖 ,    
where  𝑧𝑖𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖)  is the solution to the ith middle-level follower‟s jth 




 3  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖𝑗  = 𝑐𝑖𝑗 𝑥 + 𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑦 + 𝑕𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗  
s.t. 𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝑥 + 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑦 + 𝐸𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗  ≤ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 .                                (6.29) 
Clearly, problem (6.29) is an uncooperative MFBL decision problem. It can be 
solved by the multi-follower (uncooperative) Kth-Best algorithm given in Chapter 
4.4.3, or the multi-follower (uncooperative) Kuhn-Tucker approach given in 
Chapter 4.4.4.  











Algorithm 6.2: TLMF Kth-Best Algorithm 
[Begin] 
Step 1: Set 𝑘 = 1, adopt the simplex method to obtain the optimal solution 
 𝑥1,𝑦1, 𝑧11
1 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
1 ,…𝑧𝑛1
1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
1   to the linear programming problem (6.28). 
Let 𝑊 =   𝑥1,𝑦1, 𝑧11
1 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
1 ,…𝑧𝑛1
1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
1    and 𝑇 = ∅. Go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Put 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑘  and 𝑖 = 1, solve the uncooperative BLMF decision problems 
(6.29) and obtain the optimal solution  𝑦 , 𝑧 𝑖1,… , 𝑧 𝑖𝑚 𝑖  using the BLMF Kth-Best 
algorithm shown as the following subroutine Step 2.1-Step 2.5. Then go to Step 
3. 
Step 2.1: Set 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑘  and 𝑘𝑖 = 1, adopt the simplex method to obtain the 
optimal solution (𝑦𝑖1, 𝑧𝑖1
𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑖1 )  to the linear programming problem 
(6.30): 
min{𝑓𝑖
 2  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 | 𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑥 }.           (6.30) 
Let 𝑊𝑖
′ =   𝑦𝑖1, 𝑧𝑖1
𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑖1    and 𝑇𝑖 = ∅. Go to Step 2.2. 
Step 2.2: Put 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦 = 𝑦𝑖𝑘 , and 𝑗 = 1. Adopt the simplex method to 
solve the problem (6.31): 
min{𝑓𝑖𝑗
 3  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖𝑗  |𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖𝑗  𝑥,𝑦 }.                           (6.31) 
and obtain the optimal solution 𝑧 𝑖𝑗 .  
Step 2.3: If 𝑧 𝑖𝑗 ≠ 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑘𝑖 , go to Step 2.4. If 𝑧 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑘𝑖  and 𝑗 ≠ 𝑚𝑖 , set 𝑗 = 𝑗 + 1 
and go to Step 2.2. If 𝑧 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑘𝑖  and 𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖 , stop the subroutine, 𝐾𝑖
∗ = 𝑘𝑖  
and go to Step 2 with  𝑦 , 𝑧 𝑖1,… , 𝑧 𝑖𝑚 𝑖 =  𝑦
𝑖𝑘𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑖𝑘𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑖𝑘𝑖  . 
Step 2.4: Let 𝑊𝑘𝑖  denote the set of adjacent vertices of  𝑦
𝑖𝑘𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑖𝑘𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑖𝑘𝑖   
such that  𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝑘𝑖  implies 
{𝑓𝑖
 2  𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ≥ 𝑓𝑖
 2  𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑖𝑘𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑖𝑘𝑖  . 
Let 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖 ∪ { 𝑦
𝑖𝑘𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑖𝑘𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑖𝑘𝑖  }   and 𝑊𝑖
′ = 𝑊𝑖
′ ∪𝑊𝑘𝑖/𝑇𝑖 . Go to Step 
2.5. 
Step 2.5: Set 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖 + 1 and choose  𝑦
𝑖𝑘𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑖𝑘𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑖𝑘𝑖   such that  
               𝑓𝑖
 2  𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑖𝑘𝑖 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑖𝑘𝑖  = 
                       min{𝑓𝑖
 2  𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖   𝑦, 𝑧𝑖1,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝑖
′ . 
Go to Step 2.2. 
Step 3: If  𝑦 , 𝑧 𝑖1,… , 𝑧 𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ≠  𝑦
𝑘 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑘  , go to Step 4. If 
 𝑦 , 𝑧 𝑖1,… , 𝑧 𝑖𝑚 𝑖 =  𝑦
𝑘 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑘   and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑛, set 𝑖 = 𝑖 + 1 and go to Step 2. If 
 𝑦 , 𝑧 𝑖1,… , 𝑧 𝑖𝑚 𝑖 =  𝑦
𝑘 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑘   and 𝑖 = 𝑛 , stop and 
 𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦𝑘 , 𝑧11
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑘 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝑘  is the optimal solution to the TLMF 
decision problem (6.22) and 𝐾∗ = 𝑘. 




Step 4: Let 𝑊𝑘  denote the set of adjacent vertices of 
 𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦𝑘 , 𝑧11
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑘 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝑘   such that (𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1, 
… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 ) ∈ 𝑊𝑘  implies 
                 𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛   
  ≥ 𝑓 1  𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦𝑘 , 𝑧11
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑘 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝑘  .                                 
Let 𝑇 = 𝑇 ∪   𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦𝑘 , 𝑧11
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑘 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝑘    and 𝑊 = 𝑊 ∪𝑊𝑘/𝑇 . Go 
to Step 5. 
Step 5: Set 𝑘 = 𝑗 + 𝑘  and choose  𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦𝑘 , 𝑧11
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑘 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝑘   such 
that  
 𝑓 1  𝑥𝑘 ,𝑦𝑘 , 𝑧11
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1
𝑘 ,…𝑧𝑛1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝑘  = 
        = min
(𝑥 ,𝑦 ,𝑧11 ,…,𝑧1𝑚 1 ,…,𝑧𝑛1 ,…,𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛 )∈𝑊
𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 ,… , 𝑧1𝑚1 ,… , 𝑧𝑛1,… , 𝑧𝑛𝑚𝑛  . 
Go to Step 2. 
[End] 
6.7.4 A Numerical Example 
A numerical example is adopted to illustrate how the TLMF Kth-Best algorithm 
works.  
 
Example 6.3 Consider a TLMF decision problem in a linear version shown as 
follows with 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 , 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅 , 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑅  and𝑋 = {𝑥|𝑥 ≥ 0} , 𝑌𝑖 = {𝑦|𝑦 ≥ 0} , 𝑍𝑖𝑗 =
 𝑧𝑖𝑗  𝑧𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 , 𝑖 = 1,2,𝑚𝑖 = 2, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑖 . 
min
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓 1  𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 , 𝑧12 , 𝑧21 , 𝑧22 = −1.5𝑥 − 𝑦 + 2𝑧11 + 𝑧12 − 𝑧21 − 1.5𝑧22 
      s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧11 + 𝑧12 + 𝑧21 + 𝑧22 ≥ 10, 
            𝑥 ≤ 1.5, 
             min
𝑦∈𝑌1
𝑓1
(2) 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 , 𝑧12 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧11 + 𝑧12 
            s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧11 + 𝑧12 ≥ 6.5, 
                   min
𝑧11∈𝑍11
𝑓11
(3) 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧11 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 3𝑧11 
                 s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧11 ≥ 3.5, 
                       𝑧11 ≤ 2,                                                                        
                  min
𝑧12∈𝑍12
𝑓12
(3) 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧12 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 2𝑧12 
                 s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧12 ≥ 5, 
𝑧12 ≤ 4,                                                                       




              min
𝑦∈𝑌2
𝑓2
(2) 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧21 , 𝑧22 = 𝑥 − 𝑦 + 2𝑧21 + 3𝑧22 
             s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧21 + 𝑧22 ≥ 5.5, 
                   𝑥 + 𝑦 ≤ 2, 
                     min
𝑧21∈𝑍21
𝑓21
(3) 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧21 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 2𝑧21 
                   s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧21 ≥ 3, 
                         𝑧21 ≤ 2,                                                                       
                     min
𝑧22∈𝑍22
𝑓22
(3) 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧22 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧22 
                   s.t. 𝑥 + 𝑦 + 𝑧22 ≥ 4.5, 
                         𝑧22 ≤ 3. 
We can adopt the TLMF Kth-Best algorithm to solve the linear semi-
cooperative decision problem. First, we have to solve a linear programming 
problem in the format (6.28) of the leader. 
Step 1: Set 𝑘 = 1 and adopt the simplex method to obtain the optimal solution 





(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,3) and now 𝑊 =  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,3)  and 𝑇 = ∅. Go to Step 2 
and iteration 1 will start. 
Step 2: Put 𝑥 = 1.5 and 𝑖 = 1, and solve the BLMF decision problem in the 
form of (6.29). We can obtain the optimal solution  𝑦 , 𝑧 11 , 𝑧 12 = (0.5,1.5,3) to 
(6.29) and go to Step 3. 
Step 3: Evidently,  𝑦 , 𝑧 𝑖1,… , 𝑧 𝑖𝑚 𝑖 =  𝑦
𝑘 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑘  , 𝑖 = 1  and 𝑛 = 2 , so 
𝑖 ≠ 𝑛, set 𝑖 = 2 and go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Put 𝑥 = 1.5 and 𝑖 = 2, and solve the BLMF decision problem (6.29). 
We can obtain the optimal solution  𝑦 , 𝑧 21 , 𝑧 22 = (0.5,1,2.5) to (6.29) and go to 
Step 3. 
Step 3: Now,  𝑦 , 𝑧 𝑖1,… , 𝑧 𝑖𝑚 𝑖 ≠  𝑦
𝑘 , 𝑧𝑖1
𝑘 ,… , 𝑧𝑖𝑚 𝑖
𝑘   and go to Step 4. 




1  and the set of 
adjacent vertices 𝑊1 =   0,2,1.5,3,2,3 ,  1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3 , (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,2.5) , 
𝑇 =  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,3) ,𝑊 = { 0,2,1.5,3,2,3 ,  1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3 , (1.5,0.5,1.5, 
3,2,2.5)}. Go to Step 5. 




2  =  (0,2,1.5,3,2,3) and 
go to Step 2. This step means that iteration 1 has stopped and we cannot obtain an 
optimal solution through the iteration. The next iteration will be then executed. 
In this way, we ultimately achieve the optimal solution through seven iterations. 
The searched vertices and the detailed computing process of iterations 2-7 are 








Table 6.2 The detailed computing process of the TLMF Kth-Best algorithm 
Iteration 
k 






𝑊𝑘  T W 
2 (0,2,1.5,3,2,3) {(0,2,1.5,3,1,3),         
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,2.5)} 
{(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3), 
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,3)} 
{(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3),    
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,2.5),   
  (0,2,1.5,3,1,3),   
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,2.5)} 
3 (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,2.5) {(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,2.5)} {(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3), 
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,3), 
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,2.5)} 
{(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3),  
  (0,2,1.5,3,1,3),  
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,2.5),  
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,2.5)} 
4 (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3) ∅ {(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3), 
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,3), 
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,2.5),      
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3)} 
{(0,2,1.5,3,1,3),  
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,2.5),  
(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,2.5)} 
5 (0,2,1.5,3,2,2.5) {(0,2,1.5,3,1,2.5)} {(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3), 
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,3), 
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,2.5),    
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3), 
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,2.5)} 
{(0,2,1.5,3,1,3),  
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,2.5),  
  (0,2,1.5,3,1,2.5)} 
6 (0,2,1.5,3,1,3) ∅ {(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3), 
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,3), 
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,2,2.5),    
  (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,3), 
  (0,2,1.5,3,2,2.5), 
  (0,2,1.5,3,1,3)} 
{(1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,2.5),  
  (0,2,1.5,3,1,2.5)} 
7 (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,2.5)    
 




7  = (1.5,0.5,1.5,3,1,2.5)  is the optimal 
solution to the TLMF decision problem and the objective function values of all 
decision entities are 𝑓 1 = −1.5, 𝑓1
 2 = 6.5, 𝑓2
 2 = 10.5, 𝑓11
 3 = 6.5, 𝑓12
 3 = 8, 
𝑓21
 3 = 4, 𝑓22
 3 = 4.5. 
It is worthwhile to note that 𝑊4 = ∅ and 𝑊6 = ∅ in Table 1 do not mean that 








6   do not 
exist but may imply that their adjacent vertices have been found in previous 
iterations and have been involved in W. 
The results show that the TLMF Kth-Best algorithm provides a practical way of 
solving the proposed TLMF decision problem. However, the computational load 
of the algorithm may grow steeply with the number of variables and constraints. 
Therefore, the execution efficiency of the TLMF Kth-Best algorithm is needed to 






In a hierarchical organization, interactive decision entities exist within a 
predominantly hierarchical structure and the execution of decisions is sequential, 
from the top to the middle and then to the bottom levels. Each entity 
independently maximizes its own objective, but is affected by the actions of other 
entities at the same or different levels through externalities. Multiple followers 
commonly appear in both middle and bottom levels and have various relationships 
with each other, which results in the complication of this problem. 
This chapter presents four main issues in the area: (1) it establishes a TLMF 
decision framework which identifies64 standard situations and their possible 
combinations of TLMF decision problems; (2) it develops a DERD approach to 
effectively model various TLMF decision problems; (3) it gives a general and 
standard set of models using both DERD and programming modeling approaches, 
as well as hybrid TLMF decision models; (4) it presents solution concepts, 
theoretical properties and related algorithms for a TLMF decision problem. 
